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MODIFYING THE ESCALERA CONSENT
DECREE: A CASE STUDY ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE RUFO TEST
Valerie D. White*
Introduction
On March 10, 1994, the New York City Housing Authority Police
Department, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Fire Arms, uncovered a multi-million dollar drug ring
operating out of several New York City Housing Authority
(NYCHA) developments.' Officers confiscated $240,000 worth of
heroin, 25 guns, and over $50,000 dollars in cash.2 Five of the four-
teen federal warrants were executed on NYCHA apartments.3
Two of the drug gang members arrested resided in public housing
units, and allegedly manufactured, packaged and distributed the
heroin product out of those apartments. 4 The drug ring, operating
throughout an area in upper Manhattan and the Bronx that encom-
passed eight NYCHA developments, grossed nearly $100,000
daily.5
In a separate incident on March 15, 1994, NYCHA's Board of
Directors approved a tenant termination disposition to evict a ten-
ant whose boyfriend, son and nephew had used the tenant's project
apartment to manufacture and sell crack cocaine, and to store vari-
ous firearms and ammunition.6 This was the second proceeding
brought by NYCHA to evict this tenant.7 In the prior proceeding,
the tenant agreed to a settlement that allowed her to maintain her
tenancy if she would exclude her son from her household.8 More
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law; M.S., 1992, New
School for Social Research, Milano Graduate School of Management and Urban Pol-
icy; B.A., 1983, Fordham University.
1. Uptown Task Force Raids, NEw YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY PRESS RE-
LEASE, Mar. 10, 1994, at 1.
2. Id. at 2, 3. During the firearms phase of the investigation, the police seized an
additional 14 firearms and approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. See id. at 2.
5. Id. at 1.
6. T.C. 24, Case No. 1104/93, New York City Hous. Auth. Termination of Ten-
ancy Disposition Board Resolution, Week of Mar. 23, 1994.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
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than two years after the settlement, the tenant's son was still in
residence and was still using the apartment as a base for drug
sales. 9
These two examples represent a growing trend, not only in New
York City Housing Authority developments, but in public housing
developments across the country-the use of public housing by
residents to facilitate the drug trade.10 This use of apartments pro-
motes other illegal and dangerous activities, including violent phys-
ical assaults, and increased drug dependency. As a result, it is
virtually impossible for NYCHA to complete its mission to provide
a safe and secure environment for public housing residents."
For nearly twenty-five years, administrative procedures created
pursuant to the Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority Con-
sent Decree12 have governed NYCHA'S efforts to evict residents
9. Id. at 4.
10. See generally John P. Vitella, Council of Large Public Housing Authorities,
Report #92-1, Security, Crime and Drugs in Public Housing: A Review of Programs
and Expenditures (1992) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal). This report
presents an overview of the increase of crime in public housing authorities across the
country over the last fifteen years. Public housing authorities have employed differ-
ent strategies to combat drugs and crime in the developments. See, e.g., David E. B.
Smith, Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Constitutional Issues in Chicago's Public Hous-
ing Sweeps, 69 CMi.-KENT L. REV. 505 (1993) (After a dramatic increase in gun-re-
lated violence and persons being killed in the "crossfire", the Chicago Housing
Authority instituted "sweep" searches of residents' apartments). There have also
been many discussions surrounding the privatization of public housing authorities,
primarily because local governments have not successfully managed public housing,
with the plague of drugs being one of the primary failures. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill,
Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990) (advocating housing assistance for low-income families
in the form of vouchers and housing allowances, and allowing the private housing
market to provide the actual housing services). But see Shelby D. Green, The Public
Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law that Give Security of Tenure and
Control, 43 CAmH. U. L. REV. 681 (1994) (suggesting that public housing programs
should not be privatized, but rather corrected to operate more effectively).
11. See Vitella, supra note 10, at 5. See also Don Terry, Project Tenants See Island
of Safety Washing Away, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 4, 1991, at Al (discussing the impact of
drugs and gun-related assaults and killings on the King Towers NYCHA development
in Harlem); Robert Neuwirth, Duck for Cover in Cypress Hills, NEwSDAY, June 25,
1991, at 48 (discussing the frequent number of shots fired at the Cypress Hills Houses,
a NYCHA development in Brooklyn); Kevin Sack, The Short Life of 'Little Man' A
14-Year-Old Drug Peddler, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 29, 1989, at Al (discussing an execution
style killing of a 14-year old marijuana peddler at the Castle Hill Houses, a NYCHA
development in the Bronx).
12. Consent Decree, Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). A consent decree is a negotiated settlement
between the parties that is enforced through the court's power. Traditionally, consent
decrees have been treated as having the same characteristics of both a long-term con-
tract and a judicial decree. For a description of consent decrees and their formulation
378
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accused of using their apartments as a base for their drug trade
operations. Under the Decree, it can take years for NYCHA to
evict tenants who deal drugs from their apartments. 13 Because of
this delay, law-abiding tenants are continually subjected to the dan-
gerous and devastating effects of drugs. 14
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,15 the Supreme Court
held that defendants in institutional reform cases are subject to a
lenient standard of review for consent decree modifications. Rufo
allows for modifications when they are suitably tailored to a signifi-
cant change in facts. 16 The defendants in Escalera have returned to
the court with the hope that Rufo allows them to modify the De-
cree in light of the profound and unforeseen growth of the drug
trade in City-controlled apartments.1 7 This Note argues that be-
cause the modification stems from changed circumstances-the un-
foreseen boom in drugs-it should be granted.
Modification of the Escalera decree is appropriate under Rufo
and would allow NYCHA to maintain a safe environment for its
residents. Part I explains the standard used in modifying a consent
decree, pre-and post-Rufo, as well as the difficulties in applying the
Rufo test. Part II traces the history of the Escalera Consent De-
cree. Part III outlines the arguments for and against modification.
Part IV applies Rufo to the proposed modification of Escalera, ar-
guing that modification is appropriate because the facts have
changed significantly since the Decree was signed, and the modifi-
cation sought is appropriately tailored to these changed
circumstances.
I. Standards for Modifying Consent Decrees in Institutional
Reform Case
A. Pre-Rufo Standard
Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts
have discretion to modify a consent decree under certain circum-
in public law litigation, see Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1299-1302 (1976).
13. For a complete discussion of the eviction process under the decree, see infra
notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the dangerous effects of drugs in public housing, see infra
part IV.B.1..
15. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
16. Id. at 393.
17. The Housing Authority's Memorandum of Law In Support of its Motion for
an Order Modifying the Escalera Decree, Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 67
Civ. 4307 (WRM) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1993)[hereinafter Defendant's Brief].
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stances.'8 Before Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the
Supreme Court had construed Rule 60(b) in light of the strict stan-
dard established in United States v. Swift & Co..19 In Swift, the de-
fendants, representatives of the meat-packing industry, sought
relief from a ten-year old consent decree, resulting from an anti-
trust case brought by the government that prevented the meat-
packers from manipulating the industry.20 Defendants argued that
the industry had transformed so completely that the restraints of
the injunction had become useless and oppressive.2'
Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, held: "[n]othing less than
a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years
of litigation with the consent of all concerned." 22 The Court denied
the defendant's request to modify the decree because industry con-
ditions had not changed enough to remove the potential for the
meat-packers to resume violations of antitrust regulations.23
Since the Swift decision, courts traditionally have interpreted the
"grievous wrong" language as setting a rigorous standard to evalu-
ate requests for consent decree modification.24 Many commenta-
18. A court may modify a consent decree under certain circumstances including
change of law, change of fact, the objective of the decree has been achieved or the
decree is no longer equitable. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party...
from final judgement, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (5)...
it is no longer equitable that the judgement should have prospective applica-
tion; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgement.
Id.
19. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
20. Id. at 113.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). Swift set forth two conditions that a moving party
must prove before a decree can be modified: (1) a change in circumstances surround-
ing the decree that is so substantial that the original need for the decree no longer
exists; and (2) continued enforcement of the decree will cause undue hardship.
23. Id. at 117-19.
24. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (rejecting
modification of a consent decree when the express terms of the decree could have but
did not include provisions governing the layoff of minority firefighters hired in com-
pliance with the consent decree.) Yet, in spite of its sweeping language, the Swift
standard has met some resistance in subsequent circuit court decisions. Before Rufo,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used the language in Swift
to achieve flexible results in cases considering modifications of consent decrees. See,
e.g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 915 (1983). In Carey, the court granted the state's request
to modify a consent decree that required the state to relocate mentally retarded pa-
tients of a government institution into private group homes. The court held that for
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tors, however, criticized Swift's inflexibility, particularly in cases
involving institutional reform.25
Indeed, subsequent Supreme Court cases backed away from
Swift's grievous wrong standard.2 6 For example, in Railway Em-
ployees' v. Wright27, the Court held that a relevant change in law
was sufficient to modify a consent decree. 8 The Supreme Court
stated that a district court's power to modify a decree is inherent, 9
and that "[s]ound judicial discretion may call for the modification
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether
of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or
new ones have since arisen. ' 30 In United States v. United Shoe
Machine Corp., 1 the Supreme Court distinguished the context
under which the facts of Swift should be read-the existing and
one, the state could not have foreseen the tight real estate market which prevented
the location of homes for the patients. Id.
25. See, e.g., Timothy Stolzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification
of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx L. REV. 1101 (1986) (suggesting that mod-
ification is inevitable in institutional reform cases); Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (stating that remedies based upon the specific circum-
stances of a violation and the appropriate. legal authority must be modified to con-
form with changes in the legal authority or in circumstances). See also, Chayes, supra
note 12 (describing the need for a broad, flexible role of the court in institutional
reform litigation). For a general comment on appropriate standards for institutional
reform litigation and subsequent decree modifications, see Susan Sturm, Resolving the
Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
805 (1990). Professor Sturm's analysis states that:
A broad theory [for institutional reform litigation] requires a greater under-
standing of the extent to which a particular institutional context presents
special demands, limitations, and potential for judicial intervention than
presently exists.... Prior to evaluating the court's role in institutional re-
form litigation in general, it is important to understand the factors underly-
ing organizational stasis in a variety of institutional contexts, the parameter
of judicial involvement in those contexts, and the dynamic relationship be-
tween judicial intervention and organizational change.
Id. at 810.
26. See, e.g., Railway Employees' v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961), United States v.
United Shoe Machine Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), Board of Ed. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237 (1991).
27. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
28. In Railway v. Wright, a railroad union organization sought modification of a
1945 consent decree under which employees were not required to join the labor or-
ganization. Id. at 643. The provision was consistent with the then existing Railway
Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926). A 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act,
however, permitted union-shop agreements between railroads and labor union.
29. Wright, 364 U.S. at 647. ("[P]ower there still would be by force of principles
inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction di-
rected to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the
need." (citing Swift, 286 U.S. at 114)).
30. Id. at 647.
31. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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continuing danger of unlawful trade and manipulation in a market
which the Court had found still existed.32 In Board of Education v.
Dowell,33 the Supreme Court rejected the use of the strict "griev-
ous wrong" standard in an institutional reform case involving a
school desegregation consent decree.34 The Court distinguished
Swift, explaining that the Swift decree was intended to operate in
perpetuity to prevent unfair and unlawfultrade, while the desegre-
gation order was intended to expire upon the substantial comple-
tion of its objectives.3 5
These cases demonstrate that even before Rufo explicitly modi-
fied Swift, the Supreme Court had already eroded the inflexible
"grievous wrong" standard to allow for greater judicial discretion
in modifying consent decrees.
B. Modification Under Rufo
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,36 the Supreme Court
held that the strict standard of "grievous wrong" did not apply in
cases where the request to modify a consent decree stemmed from
institutional reform litigation. 37 The Court held that district courts
must exercise flexibility in considering modification of consent de-
crees when the defendant requesting such modification is a govern-
ment entity. 38
The plaintiffs in Rufo were detainees of the Suffolk County,
Massachusetts jail who claimed that the county violated their con-
stitutional rights because prison conditions were inadequate to
house the number of inmates detained in the facility.39 In 1979, the
plaintiffs and the Suffolk County Sheriff's office entered into a
consent decree, whereby the Sheriff's office agreed to construct a
new facility in which inmates would be confined to single occu-
32. Id. at 248. The Court held, however, that a decree may not be modified if the
purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree have not been fully achieved.
33. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
34. Id. at 240.
35. Id. at 247-48. ("From the very first, federal supervision of local school systems
was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.").
36. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
37. Id. For commentary in support of the Rufo test, see generally, Kevin E.
Hooks, Case Comment. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail: Modification of Con-
sent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 26 GA. L. REV. 1025 (1992) (stating
that the Court established a new and workable standard for consent decree modifica-
tion in institutional reform cases). But see infra part I.C. for a discussion suggesting
that the standard for review of consent decrees has not actually changed.
38. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393.
39. Id. at 372.
382
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pancy rooms.4 0 The defendants violated this and subsequent con-
sent decrees by failing to construct the new facility in a timely
fashion n.4  In 1989, when the new facility was finally under con-
struction, the Suffolk County Sheriff's office moved to modify the
consent decree to allow for double-bunking male detainees.42 The
defendant cited an unforeseen growth of the inmate population
during the planning phases of.the new jail, and sought modification
of the decree to accommodate the additional detainees.43
The District Court denied the modification, holding that the
Sheriff had not satisfied the "grievous wrong" standard necessary
to warrant modification under Swift.4 4 The court found that the
increased number of pretrial inmates was neither a new nor an un-
foreseen problem, and that the requirement of single occupancy for
the inmates was one of the most important elements of the 1979
decree.45
The Supreme Court disagreed. It exempted cases of institutional
reform litigation from Swift's "grievous wrong" standard and lim-
ited this language to the specific decree in Swift.4 6
The Court recognized the substantial increase in institutional re-
form litigation and reasoned that district courts require discretion
to decide whether to modify consent decrees.4 7 The Court' ac-
knowledged the potentially long life of 'consent decrees resulting
from institutional reform litigation and the likelihood that signifi-
cant changes would occur during the life of the decree. 48 There-
fore, the Court held that district courts should be able to modify
40. ld. (citing Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-
G (Mass., May 7. 1991)).
41..Id. at 375.
42. Id. at 376. At the time of the decree, it was unclear whether double-bunking
was constitutional. One week after the decree, in'Bell V. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
the Supreme Court made it clear that double-bunking is constitutional.
43. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 376.
44. Id. at 376-77.
45. Id. at 377 (citing Inmates of County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 564
(Mass. 1990)).
. 46. Id. at 379 (holding that Justice Cardozo's statements requiring "nothing less
that a grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" was meant to apply
specifically to the modification of the meat-packers decree, and not to all requests for
modification of a consent decree, and has been read out of context since the Swift
holding).
47. Id. at 380.
48. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380: ("The upsurge in institutional reform litigation since
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), has made the ability of a district
court to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances all the more impor-
tant. Because such decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, the
likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased.").
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consent decrees when changes occur that were unforeseen when
the agreement was made.49
1. The Rufo Test
Replacing the Swift standard, the Court in Rufo established a
two part "flexible" test for use in institutional reform cases. The
first part asks whether a significant change of law or factual condi-
tions warrants modification of the decree. 5° The second part asks
whether the proposed modification of the decree is suitably tai-
lored to alleviate the problems caused by the changed conditions
or change in law.5'
With regard to a change in law, a modification is warranted when
there has been a change in federal law either by statute or case
ruling.52 The change in law must be such that compliance with the
decree becomes illegal,53 or the change must be a clarification of a
law in existence when the consent agreement was made that
presents a situation warranting modification.54
The change in fact requirement can be satisfied in one of three
situations: (1) compliance with the decree has become substan-
tially more onerous; or (2) the decree proves unworkable because
49. This exercise in discretion does not, however, permit district courts to modify
each consent decree involving institutional reform. Id. at 383.
50. Id. at 384.
51. Id. at 383 ("[Tlhe court should consider whether the proposed modification is
suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.").
52. Id. at 388.
53. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388 ("A consent decree must be modified if, as it later turns
out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible
under federal law."). See, e.g., Railway Employees', 364 U.S. at 650-51.
54. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-90. The Court stated that clarification in itself does not
provide a basis for modifying a decree. However, the court stated that clarification
could possibly constitute a change in circumstance if it could be established that both
parties misunderstood the governing law and based their agreement on that misun-
derstanding. The Court reasoned that:
To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for reliti-
gation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the
finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation
of settlements in institutional reform litigation. ...
While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis
for modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in circumstances that
would support modification if the parties had based their agreement on a
misunderstanding of the governing law.
Id. See also Pasadena City Board of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding
that modification of a decree should be granted because the parties misinterpreted
the intervening decisional law).
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of unforeseen obstacles; or (3) enforcement of the decree without
modification would be detrimental to the public interest.55
The Rufo Court explained that the first "substantially more on-
erous" situation arises when compliance becomes substantially
more burdensome or almost impossible in the face of a continuous
good faith attempt to comply with the decree. 6 To establish that
the second "unforeseen obstacle" situation has arisen rendering
the decree unworkable, the moving party must establish that
changed circumstances were not anticipated at the time the consent
decree agreement was made. 7
The moving party can also merit a modification by establishing
that enforcement of the decree without modification would be det-
rimental to the public interest. 8 The Court noted the importance
of the public interest in institutional reform litigation because these
decrees reach beyond the parties in the suit and impact the public's
right to efficient operation of government entities.5 9
Under the second part of the test, the proposed modification is
evaluated under three criteria to determine if it is "suitably tailored
to the changed circumstance. ' 60 First, the modification must not
create or perpetuate a constitutional violation. 61 Second, the modi-
55. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384-85.
56. See id. See also Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980) (allowing modification of a consent de-
cree setting numerical quotas for welfare reform when the state determined that there
were not enough welfare recipients in the system to meet the targeted numbers set
forth in the consent decree).
57. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385. The court distinguishes "unforeseen and unforesee-
able," stating that a standard requiring both:
would provide even less flexibility than the exacting Swift test; we decline to
adopt it. Litigants are not required to anticipate every exigency that could
conceivably arise during the life of a consent decree.
If it is clear that a party anticipated changing conditions that would make
performance of the decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the de-
cree, that party would have to satisfy a heavy burden to convince a court that
it agreed to the decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply
with the decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b).
Id. at 384-85.
58. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384-85 (citing Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759-61 (7th Cir.
1985) (modification allowed to avoid pretrial release of accused violent felons)).
59. Id at 381 (citing Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989)). See
also id. at 392 ("[A] court should surely keep the public interest in mind in ruling on a
request to modify based on a change in conditions making it substantially more oner-
ous to abide by the decree."). See also Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers'
Union, 797 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 13 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1993) (extending
the flexible standard to private institutions affecting a large number of people in order
to vindicate significant public rights).
60. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.
61. Id.
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fication must not "rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to
the constitutional floor," but rather it must be tailored to resolve
only the problems created by the change in circumstances.62 Third,
the Rufo Court held that district courts should give deference to
local government administrators in modifying consent decrees. 63
The Court reasoned that local government administrators are most
knowledgeable regarding the most effective means of modifying a
decree. 64
2. Problems with the Rufo Standard
The Rufo Court seemingly provided clear guidelines for district
courts to follow when determining if a consent decree should be
modified. 65 Nevertheless, legal scholars express three primary con-
cerns over the guidance that the test set forth in Rufo actually
provides.
62. Id. ("Once a court has determined that changed circumstances warrant a mod-
ification of the consent decree, the focus should be on whether the proposed modifi-
cation is tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances. A
court should do no more, for a consent decree is a final judgment that may be re-
opened only to the extent that equity requires."). But see id. at 398 (O'Connor,
J.,concurring) ("It may be that the modification of, one term of a decree does not
always defeat the purpose of the decree.... But it hardly follows that the modifica-
tion of a single term can never defeat the decree's purpose, especially if the term is
the 'most important element' of the decree."). Justice O'Connor argues that Rufo
places greater limits on the district courts. Under Rufo, a district court may not mod-
ify a decree to include a provision which one of the parties would not have agreed to
in the original decree, but which subsequently becomes equitable and which the court
could have formerly approved under its authority in compliance with Rule 60(b)(5).
Id.
63. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 392. The Court found that local government administrators
"have the 'primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving' the problems
of institutional reform, to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modifica-
tion." Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Ed., 349 U.S. 299 (1955)).
64. Id. at 392 n.14. ("To refuse modification of a decree is to bind all future of-
ficers of the State, regardless of their view of the necessity of relief from one or more
provisions of a decree that might not have been entered had the matter been litigated
to its conclusion.").
65. But see David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Adoption of the Second
Circuit Flexible Test 58 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1239, 1274 (1993) (stating that the Rufo
test did not really change the standard of Swift, but rather is consistent with the flexi-
ble standard allowed within the language used by Justice Cardozo); Stuart A. Kauf-
man, Determining the Appropriate Standard for Modification of Consent Decrees
Arising from Institutional Reform Litigation - Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,
112 S.Ct 748 (1992), 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1133 (1992) (stating that the test estab-
lished under Rufo still harbors potential for hazardous results).
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First, the test is thought to be no different than the language of
Swift as clarified by United Shoe.66 Both cases allow for modifica-
tion of a consent decree under appropriate circumstances and
showing by the moving party.6 7 By the Rufo Court's own admis-
sion, the "grievous wrong" language was meant to apply to the
facts of Swift, and has been interpreted out of context to mean that
all requests for consent decree modifications should meet this rig-
orous standard.68 Justice Cardozo specifically stated that courts
should look carefully at the decree to determine if changed law or
circumstances justify changing the decree. 69  These additional
guidelines, which some argue do not clarify the previous guidelines,
may cause further confusion and uncertainty among the courts.7°
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court
would have better served the district courts by reviewing and ana-
lyzing the discretion afforded lower courts.7'
66. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the major-
ity's ruling does not express any clearer guidelines than the language in the Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 60(b)(5)). See also, Levine, supra note 65, at 1274 ("The Rufo opinion also
makes it clear that Swift is still valid. The test adopted in Rufo is consistent with the
structure Justice Cardozo established in Swift.").
67. See also Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961); Board of Ed. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
68. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379 ("Read out of context, this language suggests a 'harden-
ing' of the traditional flexible standard for modification of consent decrees .... But
that conclusion does not follow when the standard is read in context.") (citations
omitted). See also Swift, 286 U.S. 114-15. In the Swift opinion, Justice Cardozo distin-
guished the facts of the case from one which would warrant modification as follows:
The distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully ac-
crued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to
change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or condi-
tions and are thus provisional and tentative... The consent is to be read as
directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment of the
right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become necessary in
adaptation to events to be.
Id.
69. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15 ("[A] court does not abdicate its power to revoke or
modify its mandate, if satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through
changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong."). See Levine, supra note 65, at
1274.
70. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J. concurring). See also Kaufman, supra
note 65, at 1141 ("A continuation of past uncertainty regarding the applicable modifi-
cation standard will breed the possibility that future use of [the Rufo test] may
diminish.").
71. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 394-95 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Justice O'Connor's
concurrence stated that the District Court unnecessarily limited the extent of their
review under the Swift test:
[A]n appellate court should examine primarily the method in which the Dis-
trict Court exercises its discretion, not the substantive outcome the District
Court reaches. If the District Court takes into account the relevant consid-
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Second, the Rufo Court's deference to local government admin-
istrators has caused some concern. District courts should avoid be-
ing "too deferential" to the judgments of government defendants72
because consent decrees represent a contract between two parties.
Allowing one party to alter that decree may be inequitable.73
Finally, an overly broad or flexible standard could open the
floodgates to motions to modify consent decrees. Some defendants
may try to use the flexible approach under Rufo as an excuse to
either delay or avoid compliance with consent decrees.74 Easy
modification would make compliance with consent decrees less
meaningful to plaintiffs.
While it is too soon to determine how courts will interpret the
flexible standard set forth in Rufo, the proposed modification of
the Escalera decree provides an interesting case to analyze how
courts may apply the Rufo test.
H. The Escalera Consent Decree
In 1967, New York City Housing Authority tenants filed a class
action challenging NYCHA's eviction procedures.75 The plaintiff
erations ... and accommodates them in a reasonable way, then the District
Court's judgement will not be an abuse of its discretion, regardless of
whether an appellate court would have reached the same outcome in the
first instance ....
I think we would offer more guidance to the District Court here.., if we
would simply review the District Court's exercise of its discretion and specify
any shortcomings we might find in the method by which the court reached its
conclusion.
Id.
72. Id. at 398-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Levine, supra note 65, at
1277 ("[Tjhere is concern that the district court will be too deferential to the profes-
sional judgement of the [government] defendant.").
73. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 398-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Deference to one of the
parties to a law suit is usually not the surest path to equity .... ). See also Kaufman,
supra note 65, at 1140 ("The nature of equitable decisions requires that courts afford
equal consideration to the viewpoints of all parties concerned. A modification stan-
dard predicated on deference to the party will likely prejudice the rights of the other
party.").
74. Levine, supra note 65, at 1277 n.213.
75. Prior to this action, NYCHA and its tenants had automatic month-to-month
leases, which was terminable by either party given one month notice. When seeking
lease terminations for "non-desirability", the project manager met with the tenant to
discuss the undesirable acts and the manager's recommendation for lease termination,
and to allow the tenant an opportunity to discuss the charge. If the project manager
decided to proceed with the termination recommendation, s/he forwarded the ten-
ant's folder, or record of the tenancy, to NYCHA's eight member Tenant Review
Board (TRB). The TRB reviewed both the manager's recommendation and the ten-
ant folder. If the TRB determined that the tenant's lease should be terminated based
on the charge and the information in the folder, TRB forwarded a one-sentence no-
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class in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority 6 sought to
ensure that eviction proceedings used by NYCHA afforded "non-
desirable" tenants77 due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.78 The Second Circuit found that NYCHA procedures vio-
lated the tenants' due process rights and remanded the case for
trial, noting that class plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case
by proving that NYCHA's procedures conformed to the allega-
tions set out in the complaint.79
The court held that tenants must receive notice, before a hear-
ing, of the charges against them so that they can properly prepare
to rebut those charges.80 The pre-Escalera notice inadequately de-
scribed alleged violations; moreover the initial conference with the
project manager did not cure the lack of notice.81 Further, the
tice of charges to the tenant. The tenant had ten days to request a hearing before a
panel of two or three board members. At the hearing, the TRB panel read a sum-
mary of the entries in the tenant's folder. NYCHA presented no witnesses to sub-
stantiate the charge or the other information in the folder. The tenant was permitted
to respond to the entries in the folder, but was not permitted to review the folder's
contents. Further, the tenant was never informed of or given access to the rules and
regulations governing the TRB. Transcripts of the hearings were never produced or
maintained. When initiating lease termination proceedings for breach of rules and
regulations, the project manager held a meeting with the tenant, at which time he
informed the tenant of the alleged violation, and allowed the tenant to present his/her
version of the story. If the project manager decided to pursue termination after the
meeting, s/he forwarded the termination recommendation, tenant folder and report
on the meeting to NYCHA's Central Office. If Central Office approved of the termi-
nation NYCHA sent the tenant a thirty day notice to vacate. NYCHA filed holdover
proceedings when the tenant did not vacate after 30 days. See Escalera v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 857-59 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853
(1970).
76. Escalera, 425 F.2d 853.
77. Non-desirability was defined as "[A] detriment to health, safety or morals of [a
family's] neighbors to the community; an adverse influence upon sound family and
community life; a source of danger or cause of damage to the property of the Author-
ity; a source of danger to the peaceful occupation of other tenants; or a nuisance." Id.
at 857 (citing NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY TENANT REVIEW HANDBOOK,
Ch. VII, I, App. B at 4).
78. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment to .the U.S. Constitution states, "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of laws.. . ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. NYCHA
moved to dismiss the complaint under for failure to state a claim. The lower court
denied NYCHA's motion, and appealed.
79. Escalera, 425 F.2d at 862.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court expressed concern with this procedure because of the potential
for both the project manager and the TRB to consider information not related to the
present violation and not discussed in the initial meeting, but present in the tenant's
folder, in their decision to terminate the lease.
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court held that tenants were denied due process because they had
no opportunity to review the tenant folder prior to the hearing.,,
In addition, the court held that the tenants should have an oppor-
tunity to confront and cross-examine individuals providing the in-
formation relied upon in the termination hearing. 3 The court also
remanded the case for consideration of the propriety of NYCHA's
failure to provide the Tenant Review Board (TRB) with termina-
tion hearing rules and regulations. 84
Finally, the court held that tenants should have the opportunity
to present their cases to an impartial hearing officer.85 Although,
under the administrative procedures, tenants could request a hear-
ing to rebut the termination recommendation, such hearings were
not held until after the TRB had determined that the lease should
be terminated.86 The court found that the TRB was likely to be
biased against the plaintiff by the time of the hearing.87
The parties to the case entered into a consent decree prior to
trial. The decree established specific guidelines for NYCHA's ten-
ancy termination process. It required complete disclosure of the
charges against the tenant, access to the tenant's folder and related
records, and a full evidentiary hearing in front of an impartial hear-
ing officer.88 The consent decree specifically stated that the decree
could be modified or adjusted in light of a number of changing
circumstances, provided that the modification satisfied due process
requirements. 89
82. Id. at 862. ("[Dlenying tenants access to the material in the folder, when the
entire folder is considered by the TRB in its determination of eligibility, deprives the
tenants of due process.").
83. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970)). ("In almost every
setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.").
84. Id. at 863. NYCHA argued that the regulations amounted to no more than
mere "internal procedural guidelines" and were, therefore, not vital to the plaintiff's
ability to prepare. The plaintiffs argued, however, that knowledge of TRB regulations
was necessary for tenants to prepare for the hearing. Id.
85. Escalera, 425 F.2d at 863.
86. Id. at 863 n.7.
87. Id
88. Consent Decree at Exhibit A, § 1, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
89. Id. at Exhibit A, § 12. The parties negotiated a clause that would allow lati-
tude in modifying or amending the agreement:
The foregoing is intended to be a general outline of the procedures to be
followed in the immediate future in processing proposed termination cases,
in compliance with the Court decree. They may be hereafter amended, sup-
plemented, modified or adjusted in the light of experience, the volume of the
case load involved, economic considerations, and the needs of the Authority
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Pursuant to the consent decree, NYCHA implemented new pro-
cedures entitled "New York City Housing Authority Termination
Tenancy Procedures." 90 The new procedures consist of nine major
components that must be completed before a tenant is evicted.
The eviction process typically takes two years to complete.91
Prior to making a recommendation for termination, a project
manager must "call-in" the tenant.92 If the project manager is un-
able to resolve the issue through the "call-in,' the tenant folder
goes to NYCHA's Law Department for a hearing.93 The Law De-
partment then sends a "Notice of Charges" to the tenant at least 15
days prior to'the scheduled hearing. 94 This notice details the
charges against the tenant, describing the incident giving rise to the
hearing, when it took place, and how it violates the rules and regu-
lations as set forth by the lease. 95 This notice also informs the ten-
ant of his right to representation at the hearing.
At the first hearing date, the project manager holds another con-
ference with the tenant and offers the tenant the opportunity to
settle the case through a probationary agreement or permanent ex-
and its tenants; provided that, any such changes are consistent with, and do
not contravene due process of law.
Id. See also Note, Robert R. Zitko, The Appealability of Conditional Consent Judg-
ments,1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (1994). (discussing the standards by which conditional
consent decrees are modified). Although the Escalera decree was not a conditional
consent decree, this last clause did leave room for future changes in the decree.
90. Consent Decree at Exhibit B, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307); New York City Housing
Authority Tenant Termination Procedure 040.302 SC (Rev. 3/89) [hereinafter
NYCHA 040.302 SC].
91. See Defendant's Brief, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
92. NYCHA 040.302 SC at 1, § 2. At the "call-in," the project manager discusses
the alleged violation with the tenant, allows the tenant to explain the situation, and
informs the tenant that the situation may lead to termination of tenancy. Id.
93. Id. Prior to going to the Law Department, the case is reviewed by the Tenancy
Administrator, who also serves as the Director of Resident Review and Counseling.
NYCHA 040.302 SC at 1, § 3; Defendant's Brief at 4, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). The
Tenant Administrator reviews the folder and determines whether an intervention
would help avoid an eviction action. NYCHA 040.302 SC at 1, § 3. NYCHA assigns
tenants Social Workers to determine if an "intervention" would cure the non-desira-
ble action or breaches of rules and regulations. Interventions consist of a review by
the Social Worker, and referrals to various social services programs including drug
treatment, mental health treatment, foster care, domestic violence counseling, family
counseling, etc. Telephone Interview with Kevin Kearney, Assistant Director, Dept.
of Research, New York City Housing Authority (Jan. 31, 1996). If the Tenant Admin-
istrator determines that a basis exists to proceed with eviction, or if an intervention
has not been successful, s/he forwards the tenant folder to the NYCHA's Law De-
partment. NYCHA 040.302 SC at 1, § 3.
94. NYCHA 040.302 SC at 1, § 4.
95. Id.
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clusion of an offending household member. 96 If the case cannot be
resolved through an agreement, NYCHA sets a second date for a
hearing to proceed before an impartial hearing officer.97
The hearing is a full evidentiary proceeding with oral and written
testimony presented by both parties.98 Once the hearing is com-
pleted, the hearing officer prepares a written decision recom-
mending either termination, probation, permanent exclusion or a
finding of eligibility.99
The hearing officer forwards his written decision to NYCHA's
Board of Commissioners (the Board), which meets weekly to take
formal action on the Tenant Hearings decisions.100 The hearing of-
ficer's decision is binding on the Board, unless the Board finds that
the decision does not comply with applicable law.1 1
If, after the Board upholds an eviction, the tenant has not yet
voluntarily vacated the residence, the project manager will serve a
"Notice to Vacate," or an order from the court allowing the tenant
30 days following the end of the month in which the notice is
served to vacate the apartment. 10 2 If the tenant has not vacated
within the 30 days allotted, the manager serves upon the tenant a
holdover petition for Housing Court.10 3
Under New York State law, tenants may file an appeal to have
their case reviewed by the State Supreme Court.10 4 Tenants gener-
96. New York City Housing Authority Revised Tenant Termination Proceedings at
1, § 4, (Revised Mar. 1994)[hereinafter Revised Tenant Termination Proceedings].
See also Tyson and Randolph Consent Decrees, Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
369 F. Supp 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), discussed infra note 123.
97. Revised Tenant Termination Proceedings at 1, § 4. The impartial hearing of-
ficer is appointed through a civil service examination process. Although the hearing
officer is on the NYCHA payroll, s/he operates as an independent party in adjudicat-
ing tenant hearings. The procedure directs hearing officers to be liberal in reschedul-
ing hearings for tenants. NYCHA 040.302 SC at 2, § 5. In cases of default, or when
the tenant does not show up for the hearing, flexibility will be afforded in favor of the
tenants to reopen the case and reschedule the hearing. Id. at 2, § 8.
98. NYCHA 040.302 SC at 2, § 6(a-c).
99. Id. at 2, § 9, 10. See also Randolph Consent Decree at § 2(b), Randolph v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 74 C. 1856 (CMM) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1975) "Finding of
Eligibility" means that the tenant was vindicated of the charges against him/her, and
can remain in residence without sanction. NYCHA 040-302 SC at 2-3, § 10.
100. Revised Tenant Termination Proceedings at 1, § 5.
101. Id. The Board reviews the decision for compliance with all relevant federal,
state and local laws that govern the subject matter of the charges against the tenant.
Consent Decree at 4, § 2(a), Randolph (74 C. 1856).
102. Id. at 1, § 7.
103. Id. at 1, § 8.
104. Id. at 1, § 6, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1982).
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ally apply for and are granted a stay against eviction until the court
renders a ruling. 10 5
The housing court judge will review the case, not to determine
the merits of the eviction, but to ensure that NYCHA adhered to
all the required procedures. 0 6 If the court issues a judgment in the
NYCHA's favor, the City Marshal, under warrant, serves a 72 hour
"Notice to Evict" on the tenant.10 7
IH. Arguments For and Against Modification of the Escalera
Consent Decree
A. Defendant NYCHA's Motion to Modify the Consent
Decree
On August 2,1993, NYCHA moved to modify the Escalera De-
cree in federal court.'0 8 NYCHA would like to use the New York
State "Bawdy House Laws"'1 9 to bypass the administrative hearing
process imposed by Escalera and file summary eviction proceed-
ings against tenants who use their residence for illegal commercial
gain. 10 Under summary eviction proceedings, the tenant is served
with a notice of petition issued by an attorney, judge or clerk of the
court specifying the time and place of the eviction hearing."1' Is-
105. Revised Tenant Termination Proceedings at 1, § 6.
106. Id. at 1, § 8
107. Id. at 2, § 9. If the household includes an disabled or elderly member, the
Marshall is required to give a thirty day notice to the New York City Human Re-
sources Administration, the governmental agency charged with providing social serv-
ices to the elderly, disabled and public assistance recipients. Id.
108. Defendant's Motion to Modify the Escalera Decree, Escalera v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 67 Civ. 4307 (WRM) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1993). NYCHA moved to
first clarify the decree to allow use of the Bawdy House laws discussed infra, note 109.
NYCHA maintains that there is no language in the decree which forbids NYCHA
from using any means available under state law that governs tenancy termination ac-
tions. Defendant's Brief at 13-18, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). This Note, however, fo-
cuses on the application of the Rufo standard to the Escalera consent decree, and
therefore will not address this question.
109. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. §§ 711(5), 715 (McKinney 1979). Under § 711(5), a
landlord can bring summary eviction proceedings against a tenant who uses or occu-
pies the premise as a "bawdy house", or a place of assignment for lewd persons, or for
any illegal trade or manufacture, or any other illegal business. Section 715 permits
local law enforcement agencies to file summary eviction proceedings against the ten-
ant when the landlord, having been served a notice to apply for summary eviction
proceedings against the tenant, has not done so or made a good effort to do so within
the 5 days prescribed by the statute. The enforcement agency may bring the summary
eviction proceeding against the tenant of record, and name the landlord and any other
perceived "wrongdoers" involved in the illegal trade as respondents in the suit. N.Y.
REAL PROP. Acrs. § 715 (1).
110. Defendant's Brief at 2, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
111. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. § 731(1).
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sues of fact are heard at a trial before a housing court judge. 112 The
tenant has the right to demand a jury trial. 1 3 At the time of the
trial, the tenant may also request an adjournment, if necessary, for
no more than ten days, to prepare for the trial or obtain legal
counsel. 14
Under the "Bawdy House" proceedings, NYCHA would be able
to evict tenants who use an apartment for illegal activity in as little
as 40 days." 5 NYCHAis willing to limit its use of the "Bawdy
House" laws to cases in which the apartment has been used to fa-
cilitate illegal drug trade. 1 6 NYCHA maintains that the decree
should be modified pursuant to Rufo based on the substantial
changes in the law since the Escalera agreement was made. First,
NYCHA argues that the change of law standard, is satisfied be-
cause local prosecuting offices and neighborhood residents have re-
cently and successfully applied the "Bawdy House" laws in eviction
proceedings against local crack houses.1 7 As a landlord and owner
112. Id. § 745(1).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 23. Under the "Bawdy House" law, owners of residential property can
bring an immediate action to evict tenants who use residential property in connection
with illegal trade or business. This action can be brought by other neighborhood resi-
dents, or the local District Attorney's office. Id. In 1986, a group of neighborhood
residents filed suit under this law to close down a local crack house. See Kellner v.
Cappellini, 135 Misc. 2d 759 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1986). In 1988, local District
Attorney's Offices began to use "Bawdy House" proceedings to close down the local
crack houses under the city's Drug Eviction Program initiative. See Ken Fireman,
Tenants Turn into 'Drugbusters', NEWSDAY, June 13, 1988, at 7 (discussing the burden
of crack and the new initiative to use the "Bawdy House" laws). The District Attor-
ney's Office serves notice on the landlord to bring eviction proceedings against the
offending tenant. If the landlord fails to bring such action within 5 days, the District
Attorney names the landlord a respondent in the action for eviction, along with the
person in possession of the property. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 715 (1). In effect,
the constraints of the Escalera decree impedes NYCHA from complying with the
notice served by the District Attorneys' offices, thereby making NYCHA respondents
in an action that NYCHA wants to bring in the first place.
116. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. §§ 711(5), § 715. The statute states that proof of the
"ill repute" shall constitute the presumptive evidence of unlawful use, and must be
stated in the petition. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. § 715. See also Kings County District
Attorney's Office v. Freshley, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1994 at 30 (Civ. Ct., Kings County).
The standard for burden of proof in "Bawdy House" cases is met when "given the
quantity of drugs and related paraphernalia found throughout a premises, mere deni-
als of knowledge by an occupant are largely incredible." Id. at 31. See also New York
County District Attorney's Office v. Pizaro, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 1993, at 24, (Civ. Ct.,
N.Y. County), Levites v. Francisco, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 15, 1993, at 21, (Civ. Ct., N.Y.
County). NYCHA also contends that institution of "Bawdy House" proceedings will
not violate tenants due process rights.
117. New York State enacted this law in 1868, and it was primarily enforced against
houses of "iU-repute"-to deter prostitution, illegal alcohol manufacture and sale,
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of residential property, NYCHA argues that application of "Bawdy
House" laws now extends to NYCHA as well. 118
Second, NYCHA contends that the change is justified by recent
amendments to the United States Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) regulations that allow public housing au-
thorities to forego administrative hearings in an eviction involving
any criminal activity that threatens the health or safety of other
tenants. 1 9 'Virtually all large public housing authorities in the
United States bypass administrative -hearings in eviction cases that
involve drug-related charges and proceed directly to their particu-
lar jurisdiction's judicial proceeding.120 As the nation's largest
public housing authority, NYCHA would like to exercise this pro-
vision in the HUD regulations and proceed to housing court under
"Bawdy House" laws.
NYCHA also argues that Escalera should be modified under the
change in fact standard established in Rufo. NYCHA asserts that
the dramatic increase in drug trade in public housing was unfore-
seen when the consent agreement was made, and that as a result,
tenants are at great risk. NYCHA argues that the public interest
and bookmaking. Defendant's Brief at 25, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307) ("The 'Bawdy
House Law' derives form statutes adopted in 1868 to combat prohibition and
gambling.").
118. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 711 (5) permits landlords to bring summary eviction
proceedings against tenants using their residence for illegal commercial gain. Since
neighbors and law enforcement agencies have exercised their right to evict drug deal-
ers under § 715(1) then it follows that landlords such as NYCHA should also be able
to exercise that right.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1983). This amendment to the United States Hous-
ing Act of 1937 requires all public housing authorities to establish and implement
administrative grievance procedure.. Defendant's Brief at 26, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
The amendment also permits public housing authorities to forego administrative pro-
ceedings in favor of judicial proceedings, as long as HUD determines that the judicial
eviction proceedings guarantee basic due process elements under the law. Id. See
also CRANSTON-GONZALEZ NATIONAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING Acr, PUB. L. No.
101-625 (1990), which narrowed the scope of the HUD Hearing Exclusion rule. The
Act states that the HUD Administrative Hearing Exclusion rule applies to:
any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy that involves
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees of the public hous-
ing agency or any drug-related activity on or near such premises.
Id. at § 503(a). The HUD Administrative Hearing Exclusion regulations were
promulgated in 1991. 56 C.F.R. § 51.560 (1991). In 1991, HUD issued a formal deter-
mination that "New York's judicial proceedings guaranteed due process." Defend-
ant's Brief at 27, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). See also id at 27-28 (citing Letter from
Secretary Jack Kemp, United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, to Honorable Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York (Dec. 3,
1991)).
120. Defendant's Brief at 28, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
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calls for modification of the decree because the presence of drug
businesses in NYCHA developments has resulted in a hazardous
condition that is detrimental to the public.121
The Interim Counsel of Presidents (ICOP) for New York City
Housing Authority developments has intervened in the case on the
side of the defendant. 22 ICOP seeks to modify the Escalera de-
cree, and asks the court to review other consent decrees that may
impede on NYCHA's ability to evict speedily drug dealing
tenants. 12
3
121. See id. at 19-25.
122. Motion to Intervene, Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth. 67 Civ. 4307
(LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1994).
123. Id. See Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Tyson and Randolph were part of a four party consolidated action. These cases led to
a partial settlement stipulation, which was entitled the Tyson Consent Decree in 1975.
The final settlement, entitled the Randolph Consent Decree, was agreed upon one
year later. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Modify the Escalera Consent Decree, at 10 n.4, Escalera v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 67 Civ. 4307 (LAP) (Apr. 11, 1994)[hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief]. These two
decrees established remedial options for cases decided pursuant to Escalera.
In Tyson, the class challenged lease termination on the ground of non-desirability
when adult children who no longer reside in the development commit the offending
acts. Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 517. The federal district court held that it was unconstitu-
tional for NYCHA to evict an entire family on the basis of the undesirable acts of one
family member who was not part of the household. Id. at 518. Imposing sanctions on
tenants based on their children's conduct violates the tenants' First Amendment right
of freedom of association. Id. at 519. The court held: "[t]here must be some causal
nexus between the imposition of the sanction of eviction and the plaintiffs' own con-
duct. [The simple] existence of the parent-child relationship [is not enough]....
[D]eclaring these tenants ineligible for continued occupancy on the basis of their chil-
dren's acts ... would run afoul of the First Amendment which guarantees to every
person the right to freely associate with others, including members of his family, with-
out interference from the state." Id. at 519-20.
Under the Tyson decree, NYCHA cannot evict tenants and instead must place
them on probation in cases when the offending member is absent from the household.
Consent Decree at § 1, Tyson (73 C. 859). Absent from the household is defined as
confinement in jail, away in the Armed Services, participating in drug programs, etc.
Additionally, the decree allows the hearing officers discretion to place tenants on pro-
bation if it appears unlikely that the non-desirable conduct will reoccur, if the non-
desirable situation has been cured, or if steps are taken to correct or cure offending
action. Consent Decree at 5 § 2(b), Randolph (74 C.1856). While the tenants cannot
be evicted solely due to the acts of their adult children, the tenant can be evicted if the
offending party continues to reside in the household and the tenant of record does not
agree to remove that party.
The two latter decrees were negotiated in order to protect the rights of tenants who
have not been accused of non-desirable conduct. Tyson and Randolph addressed con-
stitutional issues regarding tenants being evicted for the acts of adult children no
longer living in their residence, or situations where the offending family member
could be permanently excluded from the residence, as opposed to Escalera, where the
issue is the tenant of record being accessed of the undesirable act occurring in the
1996] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSENT DECREES 397
As tenants and representatives of the resident population, ICOP
has expressed a desire to modify Escalera to permit the use of the
"Bawdy House" laws for expeditious removal of tenants involved
in drug-related activity. ICOP claims that the developments have
become a danger zone, and that the most effective way to combat
the negative effects of drugs in the projects would be to evict those
residents who either sell or permit the sale of drugs in their
apartments.124
B. Plaintiffs' Argument Against the Modification
The plaintiff class, represented by the Legal Aid Society, asserts
that modification of the decree would strip innocent tenants of im-
portant legal rights.125 Representatives of the plaintiff class moved
to uphold the Escalera consent decree on three grounds. First, the
class asserts that there has not been a substantial, unforeseen
change in fact as required for modification of a consent decree
under Rufo.1 26 The class argues that the "drug epidemic" is exag-
gerated, and that, in fact, the amount of drugs present now was
already present in NYCHA developments twenty years ago when
the consent decree agreement was made. 12 7
apartment. A modification to the Escalera decree will not interfere with the applica-
tion of either the Tyson or Randolph decrees.
124. Complaint of Intervenors-Plaintiffs at §§ 11, 15 Escalera v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 67 Civ. 4307 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1994)[hereinafter Intervenor's
Complaint]. ICOP contends that "[t]he quality of life in NYCHA housing has deteri-
orated significantly since the Escalera decree was entered into in 1971. The sense of
security and well-being for many NYCHA residents has been destroyed. Many fear
to leave their apartments except for essential errands or to allow their children to play
outside close supervision." Id. at § 11. Under HUD regulations, the peaceful use and
enjoyment is a fundamental provision that each public housing authority must afford
their residents. See supra, note 119.
125. See Plaintiff's Brief at 5-6, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). See also Deborah Pines,
The City Takes Aim at Long-standing Consent Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1, 1996, at 1
("Scott A. Rosenberg, director of the Civil Appeal and Law Reform Unit of the Legal
Aid Society, however, argues that the proposed change threatens the rights of inno-
cent tenants wrongly accused of drug-dealing, such as a grandmother whose grandson
stores drugs in her apartment without her knowledge.").
126. Plaintiff's Brief at 37, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
127. Id. at 4, 38-39. Plaintiffs also contend that an increased police presence begin-
ning in the early 1990s has resulted in steady reduction in crime in NYCHA develop-
ments over the last five years. Id. at 41. In fact, the plaintiffs have submitted
affidavits from several experts asserting that the impact of the drug trade has not
changed significantly since the Escalera Consent Decree, in contrast to the affidavits
submitted by NYCHA's experts, which assert that the influx of drugs has increased
dramatically. Because they contain directly contradicting assertions, the District
Court admitted these affidavits as direct evidence, and held an evidentiary hearing in
January, 1996, during which the parties cross-examined each other's experts.
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Second, the plaintiffs contend that even if there has been a
change of fact, NYCHA could impose more narrowly tailored
means that would effectuate expeditious removal of tenants who
trade drugs in NYCHA apartments. 128 The class also argues that
through its internal procedures, NYCHA controls the length of
time it takes for eviction in drug-related cases. Plaintiffs believe
that NYCHA can easily modify the existing administrative process
rather than eliminate that process in all drug-related cases. 129
Third, the class argues that'NYCHA has not demonstrated the
change in law required by Rufo. NYCHA entered into the consent
decree with full knowledge of the "Bawdy House Laws," which
have been in existence for over 100 years.130 The class contends
that NYCHA willingly included drug-related evictions in the con-
sent decree, and was free to negotiate the exclusion of such cases
when the agreement was reached twenty-four years ago.' 3 ' The
plaintiffs argue that NYCHA could have bargained to exempt
"Bawdy House" cases from the consent decree. 132 Further, the
class argues that the amended HUD rules which exclude some
cases from the hearing requirement do not satisfy the change in law
standard, since there was no administrative hearing requirement in
effect at the time the consent decree agreement was made. 33
128. Id. at 2, 4. For example, the plaintiffs argue that NYCHA should employ a
change in policing strategies to alleviate drug activity and associated crimes. Chang-
ing police strategies include increasing the police force, increase or doubling patrols,
community and tenant patrols, etc. Id.
129. Id. at 4, 50-54, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). Plaintiffs state that NYCHA can, as a
matter of internal policy, expedite or prioritize those cases which would otherwise fall
under the "Bawdy House" proceedings by scheduling hearings for those cases first.
See id. at 51.
130. Plaintiff's Brief at 46, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
131. See id. at 23-24, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
132. Id.
133. Id at 47-48. The plaintiffs also maintain that the proposed modification will
violate the Tyson and Randolph decrees. Tyson would be violated, plaintiffs contend,
if innocent tenants unaware of their family member's drug activity were subject to
speedy eviction proceedings under the modification. Id. at 26. Similarly, plaintiffs
contend that Randolph is endangered because "Bawdy House" proceedings do not
allow tenants of record to remain in NYCHA developments upon agreeing to a pro-
bationary period by permanently excluding the offending household member from
the apartment. Id. at 25-26. However, consideration of these two decrees as they
relate to Escalera will not be analyzed in this Note.
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IV. The Proposed Modification of Escalera Meets the
Standards Set Forth under Rufo
Rufo allows modification when: (1) there is a demonstrated
change of law or fact, and (2) the proposed modification is suitably
tailored to such changed circumstances.13 4 Although NYCHA has
failed to demonstrate a change in law which calls for modification
of the Escalera Decree, it has met the change in fact standard
under Rufo. NYCHA has also shown that the proposed modifica-
tion is suitably tailored to' deal with problems caused by the drug
epidemic. The Escilera Decree, therefore, should be modified to
allow NYCHA use of "Bawdy House" proceedings to evict drug-
dealing tenants.
A. The Change in Law Does Not Satisfy Rufo's Test
The change in law asserted by' NYCHA fails to meet either one
of the two elements under which the change in law requirement
can be satisfied-that continued compliance with the decree with-
out modification would be illegal, or that both parties based the
agreement on a misinterpretation of the law. NYCHA argues the
first element of the change in law standard.135
The movant must establish that there has been a change in fed-
eral law by statute or case ruling in order to satisfy the change of
law requirement under the first element. Neither of the two
changes cited by NYCHA pass this prong of the test. "Bawdy
House" regulations existed at the time the Escalera agreement was
made. 136 Further; compliance with the Escalera decree does not
violate the "Bawdy House" provisions. The law states that the
landlord may bring eviction proceedings in the prescribed circum-
stances. 137 . The law does not require the landlord to bring such
proceedings. 138
134. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992).
135. NYCHA does not assert the existence of any misinterpretation of the law
when the consent decree agreement was made, and there is no evidence that would
support such an argument.
136. Plaintiff's Brief at 15, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307) ("The 'Bawdy House' law had
been in effect for over 100 years when the consent decree was entered into.").
137. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. § 711.
138. Id. The law does allow others to bring an action to evict the tenant, and name
the landlord as a respondent. NYCHA is named respondent in cases in which the
District Attorney brings "Bawdy House" proceedings. However, given the large
number of public housing apartments qualifying for "Bawdy House" eviction pro-
ceedings, the District Attorney's offices can only institute proceedings in a fraction of
these situations.
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Similarly, while the amendments to HUD regulations can be
classified as changes in law, these changes do not make continued
compliance with the decree illegal. Continued compliance with the
Escalera decree does not violate HUD regulations because the reg-
ulations merely permit exclusions from the administrative hearing
process; they do not require public housing authorities to by-pass
administrative hearing proceedings in drug-related case.' 39 In ad-
dition, HUD regulations are only minimal guidelines for public
housing authorities to follow. 4 0
B. The Changes in Fact Satisfy the Rufo Standard
One of three situation can satisfy the change in fact requirement:
(1) when compliance with the decree has become substantially
more onerous; (2) when the decree proves unworkable because of
unforeseen obstacles, or; (3) when enforcement of the decree with-
out modification would be detrimental to the public interest.
14 1
1. Dangers Caused by the Drug Trade Make Compliance with
the Escalera Consent Decree Substantially More Onerous
The enormous increase in illegal drug operations in NYCHA de-
velopments satisfies the first situation described in Rufo. Over the
last decade, the crack epidemic has had a staggering effect on the
quality of life in public housing projects, both in New York City
and around the country.' 42 Crime has become a major public con-
cern among neighborhood residents as well as among the tenants
in public housing.' 43 NYCHA developments have experienced sig-
nificant increases in crime and violence. 44 These increases directly
139. See supra note 119 for a discussion of the HUD Administrative Hearing Ex-
clusion regulations.
140. See Escalera, 925 F.2d at 861.
141. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.
142. See Vitella, supra note 10, at 35-37; see also Tony Marcano, Going Home, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1995, § 13, at 1 (comparing the working class and safe community of
the James Monroe Houses in the Bronx from 1961-1981 to the current drug-infested
conditions that exist in the very same development) ("During the 80's... crack had
taken over the projects and a drug lord took control. There were turf wars. Crack left
victims everywhere."); Karen Springen, Gun Sweeps and Civil Liberties, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 18, 1994, at 27 (discussing the "Operation Sweeps" program instituted by the
Chicago Housing Authority to decrease the number of "gang-related" shootings).
143. See Smith, supra note 10, at 505. ("Describing life in America's public housing
projects as 'hell' or 'Beruit U.S.A.' trivializes a desperately tragic situation. Random
gunfire and violent death are part of each child's education." (citations omitted)).
144. Compare N.Y. CITY Hous. AUTH., HOUSING POLICE STATISTICES-INCINDENT
REPORT (Year-end 1971)[hereinafter HOUSING POLICE STATISTICS] with HOUSING
POLICE STATISTICS (Years-end 1992-1994) (copies of reports for all years cited herein
400
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coincide with the onset of crack cocaine use in NYCHA
developments.
During the 1980s, NYCHA experienced consistent and extreme
increases of drug-related crime. Between 1980 and 1989, reported
drug-related offenses grew from 971 to 6,849 per year-an increase
of 605 %.145 Further, 1994 drug-related crimes reached a dangerous
high of 12,706.146
Violent crimes against individuals have increased dramatically
since the implementation of the Escalera decree, climbing from 503
incidents in 1971 to 8,734 incidents in 1994.147 Also in 1994, there
were 258 incidents of gun assaults and 100 reported incidents of
shots fired.148
These statistics demonstrate a drastic change in the quality of life
in the developments. 149 NYCHA attributes these changes to the
increased presence of drugs, particularly crack cocaine. 150 Because
it is easy and inexpensive to manufacture and profitable to sell,
are on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal). These statistics are collected and
maintained under standards set by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Law
enforcement agencies across the country collect and maintain crime statistics uni-
formly in accordance with these standards for national comparison studies.
145. HOUSING POLICE STATISTICS (Year-end 1980 and Year-end 1989). "Drug re-
lated crimes" include possession or sale of marijuana, opium, cocaine, synthetic nar-
cotics, or "other dangerous drugs."
146. HOUSING POLICE STATISTICS (Year-end 1994).
147. HOUSING POLICE STATISTICS (Years-end 1971 and 1994). "Violent Crimes"
include murder, manslaughter, rape, attempted rape, assualt, robbery, sexual abuse
and sodomy.
148. HOusING POLICE STATISTICS (Year-end 1994).
149. See also Complaint of Intervenor-Plaintiffs at 4-5, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). The
parties supplying affidavits in support of the motion to intervene have been residents
for an average of over 20 years. All attest to the increased presence of drugs in public
housing, and the impact lengthy administrative procedures have had on removing
drug-dealing tenants. For instance, Ronald Ward, ICOP Board Member from Brook-
lyn East, states that his son was murdered by drug dealers in 1985, during the height
of the crack epidemic. Affidavit of Ronald Ward in Support of Motion to Modify and
Intervene at 4, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). See also Marcano, supra note 142; Ian Fisher,
Promise and Despair Share Project, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at § 1, 23 (describing
the effect of the significant drug trade at the Gowanus Houses in Brooklyn on the
other residents in the development) ("At Gowanus, the early, upwardly mobile prom-
ise of public housing exists side by side with its later scourges: drugs, hopeless poverty
and gunfire."). See also id. ("The drive to improve Gowanus has come at a cost to
Mitsy Andino, the head of the all-but-ignored tenant association. In December 1991,
she was washing dishes when she heard a blast and a glass to her left shattered.
Someone, still unknown, had fired a bullet through her peephole .... After the shoot-
ing, which she is convinced was a result of her work with the tenant association, Mrs.
Andino thought she would give up-if not for her own sake, then for the safety of her
children.").
150. Defendant's Breif at 8, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307).
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crack has become a major source of income for some tenants. 151
This ease of production and sale has increased the influence of
drugs in NYCHA developments all the more. 152
The negative effects of the drug trade in NYCHA developments
are numerous and devastating. First, the crime associated with the
drug business presents a severe danger to the other residents of
public housing. 153 Specifically, most drug dealers carry guns and
often engage in "shoot-outs" on NYCHA grounds. 154 As a result,
numerous innocent people have been killed.' 55
Second, the drug trade operation cause a public hazard and nui-
sance to the other tenants and employees of NYCHA. Customers
151. See Affidavit of DeForrest W. Taylor at 8, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). See also
Peter Archer, MPs Warn of National Crack 'Epidemic', PRESS ASSOCIATION LIMITED,
July 27, 1989 (stating that crack is easily manufactured and easily available wherever
cocaine is available); Terry, supra note 11 (describing teen life at the Martin Luther
King Jr. Towers in Harlem, where some young residents gather at a comer adjacent to
the, project to sell drugs).
152. See generally, Marcano, supra note 142 ("During the 80's... crack took over);
Fisher, supra note 149 ("Hand-in-hand, the boys [ages five and nine years, on their
way to school] stepped past countless crack vials, syringes and an empty 9-millimeter
shell ... ); see also id. ("Slowly ... and most recently with the crack epidemic, the
bonds of community and family began to strain.").
153. See Ward Affadavit at 130, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). Dangers include violence
in the form of "wars" between competing operations. See Dennis Duggan, On the
Street, the Monsters Are in Charge, NEWSDAY, Dec. 22, 1994, at 4 (describing the influ-
ence of drugs and guns in the Red Hook Houses, where a local junior high school
principal was shot and killed in the cross-fire of a shoot-out between teenagers in rival
gangs); Marcano, supra note 142. ("[O]ne reason the drug wars ended was that most
of the combatants killed each other off or ended up in prison. The causalities were
not only drug dealers, but residents who, while they survived in body, were dead in
spirit.")
154. See Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 571, 577 (1995) ("Guns are essential to carrying on the drug trade, since drug
dealers must enforce their own contracts and provide their own protection from
predators.").
155. See Intervenor's Complaint at 5, Escalera (67 Civ 4307). See, e.g, Marcano,
supra note 142 ("On Christmas Night, 1987 ... [a] 4-year-old boy, playing with his
Christmas presents, was killed by a random shot that crashed through his family's
apartment window... [in] one of the buildings at Monroe [NYCHA development].");
David Kocieniewski & Curtis L. Taylor, The Project, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1992, at 4.(In December, 1992, Patrick Daly, principal of the local junior high school was killed
while searching for a student in Brooklyn's Red Hook Housing Project. Daly walked
into the middle of a "turf war" between two drug-dealing teens who were in a shoot-
out for control of the cocaine trade business). See also Joseph P. Fried, 2 Found Dead
After Relative Testifies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at B1 (A witness testified in a major
drug-related murder trial against Gerald (Prince) Miller, whom police have termed
the head of a major violent crack-trafficking ring. The day after the witness testified,
his father-in-law and sister-in-law were found slain in their Baisley Park Houses
NYCHA apartment in Queens. Police strongly believed that they were killed because
of the witness's cooperation with the prosecution).
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of these establishments use the drugs they purchase in the hallways
and stairhalls of the development. 156 This causes loitering in the
buildings, which often leads to vandalism and destruction of prop-
erty and increased maintenance costs for NYCHA. 157 Addition-
ally, this presents a safety hazard to other tenants who want access
to the public areas because many of the drug users either assault,
rob or threaten tenants as they move through the hallways. 15
Third, almost half of NYCHA's population is under age 21.119
NYCHA has an obligation to these youths to provide safe condi-
tions for their personal development and growth.160 Drug dealers
have a negative influence on the impressionable minds of already
financially and socially challenged youngsters. This influence can
lead to false glorification of the drug business' 6' and ultimately
many of these youngsters make poor choices. Some are recruited
into the drug trade at young ages. 162 Once in, all the hope for a
future through education and other respectable means are lost. 163
Fourth, NYCHA is forced to spend millions of dollars annually
on security to protect tenants from the influence of illegal drug
trade in the developments. Since 1990, NYCHA has spent over
$50 million dollars through the Public Housing Drug Elimination
156. See Comment, Michelle J. Stahl, Oscar v. University Students Cooperative
Ass'n: Can Citizens Use RICO to Rid Neighborhoods of Drug Houses, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 799, 800 (1992) ("Many [public housing residents] said that crime and
drugs have become so bad in their buildings that they have become virtual hostages in
their own homes. In many high-rise public housing developments, the streets have
come indoors and hallways and stairwells have taken on the look of the Worst avenues
and alleys.").
157. See generally Stahl, supra note 156, at 800.
158. Id.
159. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, DEPT. OF RESEARCH & POLICY DE-
VELOPMENT, SPECIAL TABULATION OF TENANT CHARACTERISTICS (as of Jan. 1, 1995)
(copy on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal)[hereinafter NYCHA TENANT
CHARACTERISTICS].
160. For a discussion of the effect of crime on children, see New Campaigns Helps
Children Prevent Violent Crime, CATALYST (National Crime Prevention Council,
Washington D.C.), Mar. 1993. Statistics show that eight out of ten kids will be victims
of violent crime at least once in their lives, and nearly half a million admit they have
carried a weapon for protection. Id. at 3.
161. See Duke, supra note 154, at 577 ("Due in large part to its association with the
glamorous drug trade, packing a gun, like fancy clothing or costly jewlry, has become
a status symbol among many adolescents.").
162. Intervenor's Compalint at 5, 13, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). See also Sack, supra
note 11 ("Little Man" began selling marijuana, along with several other boys, at age
thirteen. They all worked for the same man. "Little Man" was executed in the court-
yard of the Castle Hill Houses in the Bronx at age fourteen. His family and friends
"believe he was killed because he threatened to break with his marijuana supplier and
set up a competing operation.").
163. See generally Sack, supra note 11.
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Program, in order to provide services such as drug treatment for
tenants, increased police presence, alternative activity and educa-
tion services for youths, and a host of other programs specifically
targeted to eliminate drugs in public housing. 164 However, the Es-
calera decree has not permitted NYCHA to do the one thing that
would have the most immediate impact on removing the influence
of drugs in public housing-speedily evict persons who deal drugs
out of their apartments.
2. The Explosion in Drug Traffic is an Unforeseen Obstacle
Making the Decree Unworkable
The second element of the Rufo standard requires NYCHA to
demonstrate that unforeseen changes have made the decree un-
workable. NYCHA could not possibly have predicted the extent
to which its residential property would be used for illegal commer-
cial gain today.' 65 The number and nature of violations taking
place at the time the Decree was entered into did not rise to the
level of illegal conduct taking place in NYCHA developments
today. 166
Plaintiffs are incorrect in asserting that the drug epidemic is ex-
aggerated, or that there is just as much violence related to drugs
today as there was in 1972.167 The increase of drug-related violent
164. See generally NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY PUBLIC HOUSING DRUG
ELIMINATION PROGRAM APPLICATIONS (1990 through 1995). To combat drugs in
public housing authorities, HUD established a grant program under the Anti Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 for the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program. 42 U.S.C.
11903 (1988). Public housing authorities apply for grants for various activities that
help alleviate the negative impact of drugs in public housing developments. NYCHA
has consistently been awarded the largest grant amounts each year, and their Drug
Elimination Program serves as a nation-wide model. See also Vitella, supra note 10,
at 9-12.
165. Under Rufo, that standard is "unforeseen" obstacles, not "unforeseeable" ob-
stacles. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385. The Court, however, did state that a movant should
not be granted a modification if he relied on events that were anticipated at the time
of the agreement, and then later rendered the consent decree unworkable. Id. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
166. See Escalera, 425 F.2d at 858, 859 (The violations committed by the appellants
in Escalera included: keeping a dog in the apartment; statutory rape of a tenant's
daughter by another tenant's child; and drug possession where the offending child of
the resident was arrested several miles from the development).
167. See RHA Drug Elimination Grants I, II, III, IV (Overview) (1994) (citing
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA (1989) (C. Everett Koop,
former Surgeon General of the United States, declared that, "It is impossible to over-
state the danger drug use poses to our country and our citizens.")). But see Plaintiff's
Brief at 38-42, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307). Plaintiffs contend that both heroin and co-
caine were readily available in the 1970s, and related violence was a major part of the
drug trade business at that time. Id. Expert affidavits in favor of the plaintiffs state
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crime is well-documented throughout the country.168 As no other
entity in the nation has been able to predict and combat the influx
of drugs and crime, neither could NYCHA have foreseen the im-
pending drug epidemic when entering into the Escalera decree.
In 1971, NYCHA residents were largely working class families
who sought residences in the developments as a viable and respect-
able housing option.169 Many of the residents went on to purchase
their own homes after leaving the projects. 170 Today, many resi-
dents look to public housing as "a housing of last resort.'
17
'
NYCHA applicants and new tenants are now either formerly
homeless, receiving public assistance, or facing some of the other
societal problems that challenge urban areas. 172 Some residents
turn to the drug trade to earn a regular income because it is so easy
to enter the business. This recent change in the social structure of
housing developments could not have been foreseen when the Es-
calera agreement was made. 73
that the negative impact of drugs and related violence has changed little over the last
twenty-five years. See Plaintiff's Motion at 38-42, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307) (citing
Hamid Affidavit, 120, Goldstein Affidavit, 115, 8, 10, Morgan Affidavit 5-8).
168. See Vitella, supra note 10, at Attachment A, 35-37. This appendix presents the
change in crime in the 25 most populated cities in the country from 1975-1990, and
from 1985-1990 in two areas-crimes against both persons and property.
169. When NYCHA was created in 1934, the premise was to provide affordable
and sanitary housing for the working poor. In the 1970s, NYCHA asserted its inten-
tion to keep its population at 33% working poor, 33% elderly, and 33% public assist-
ance recipients. The percentage of public assistance recipients, however, did not go
above 27% until 1990. Now, public assistance recipients comprise over 30% of
NYCHA's population, with the number of applicants and new tenant receiving public
assistance at well over 60%. NYCHA TENANT CHRACrERISTICS (as of Jan. 1, 1970
and Jan. 1. 1990). See also Ruben Franco, From Welfare to Work in New York City
Public Housing, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1197, 1197 (1995).
170. Franco, supra note 169, at 1198 (According to Franco, public housing "served
as an important way-station on the road to the middle-class and a bridge to the daz-
zling possibilities of the greater world outside public housing.").
171. Id. at 1199.
172. In 1988, the NYCHA made an agreement with the City of New York to house
a quota of homeless families who were referred from the City shelter system. Ini-
tially, the impact was small, comprising of less than 1,000 of the 8,000 new tenants
each year. However, the City increasingly referred more homeless people, many of
whom suffer severe social and family problems and are on public assistance. With the
increase of public assistance recipients who are on the NYCHA's waiting list through
the normal application process, (not homeless referrals) the pool of welfare families
have increased in NYCHA developments. Telephone Interview with Kevin Kearney,
Assistant Director, Dept. of Research, New York City Housing Authority, (Jan. 31,.
1996).
173. In fact, public housing authorities across the country have suffered dire im-
pacts on the quality of life in their developments due to the impact of drugs. The
societal changes attributed to the presence of drugs in public housing have been se-
vere and were totally unforeseen. See generally Vitella, supra note 10.
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3. Continued Enforcement of the Decree without Modification is
Detrimental to the Safety of the Public
Under Rufo, a court may also consider the public's interest in
modifying a consent decree in cases of institutional reform. 74
These cases effect not only the parties bringing suit, but also the
entire population served by the governmental institution.175  The
court must determine how the change in circumstances will effect
the population at large, in order to determine whether the 'circum-
stances are severe enough to warrant modification of the decree. 176
If the changed conditions have created a situation that is not in the
best interest of the public, the court is likely to approve a modifica-
tion that will address those changes appropriately without violating
the rights of the plaintiff class.
The dangers associated with prolonged occupancy of public
housing apartments by drug-dealing tenants create a hazard not
only to the residents of public housing, but also to the communities
surrounding these developments. 177 Despite plaintiff's arguments
to the contrary, the court will likely recognize the increase in drug-
related incidents over the last twenty-five years, and find it in the
public's best interest to evict speedily drug businesses in public
housing.17
8
174. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.
175. See id. at 384-85 (citing cases where modification decisions were influenced by
the State's ability to accomodate a particular population).
176. Id. (holding "modification is appropriate... when enforcement of the decree
without modification would be detrimental to the public interest... "); see also supra
note 55 and surrounding accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
178. The court also will view the motion to intervene by the ICOP in NYCHA's
favor. In this instance, the "public" is the residents of public housing. If the public's
safety is threatened, and the public is denied its guaranteed right of use and enjoy-
ment of NYCHA property, the court will likely balance the right of all NYCHA resi-
dents against the rights of the drug dealing tenants, whose constitutional rights will
also be protected under the modified consent decree. The public wants to modify the
Escalera decree and the modification is necessary for the public's safety. The irony
will not be lost on the court that the members of the class that the plaintiff represents
have moved to intervene on behalf of the defendant. Plaintiffs are arguing to protect
the class, who in turn want the modification as proposed by the defendant. Under
Rufo, the court must take into account the public's interest. Therefore, the court will
likely modify the decree in NYCHA's favor.
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C. The Proposed Modification of the Escalera Decree is
Suitably Tailored to Solve the Problems Associated with
the Significant "Change in Fact" under Rufo
Once it is determined that changed factual circumstances war-
rant a modification of the Escalera consent decree, the court must
review the proposed modification to evaluate if it is substantially
tailored to the changes. Under this requirement, the proposed
modification (1) must not create a constitutional violation, (2) must
be tailored to resolve the problems created by the changed circum-
stances, and (3) should give deference to local government
agencies.179
1. The Proposed Modification Does Not Create a Constitutional
Violation
The proposed modification, using "Bawdy House" proceedings,
does not create a constitutional violation, but in fact provides the
very same constitutional elements of due process sought in the
original complaint.
The purpose of the decree is to ensure that tenants facing termi-
nation proceedings are, afforded appropriate due process rights.
18 0
This can be achieved effectively in housing court. NYCHA is
merely seeking to by-pass administrative hearings and proceed di-
rectly to housing court in those extreme cases that fit within the
"Bawdy House" specifications, where it can be reasonable deter-
mined that the tenant of record either used or permitted others to
use the apartment for illegal drug trade.
In cases where the District Attorney's offices have brought
"Bawdy House" proceedings against NYCHA tenants, the courts
have held that the assurance of due process required by Escalera is
satisfied by "Bawdy House" laws. In New York County District
Attorney's Office v. Oquendo,18' for example, the District Attorney
brought a "Bawdy House" action against a public housing resident.
179. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391-92.
180. This is evidenced in the original Escalera complaint, which prayed that
"[T]enants [first be] afforded an opportunity to contest the reasons for the termina-
tion of the tenancy upon which the summary proceeding is based at a fair hearing,
whether before the agency or a court which complies with the minimal elements of
due process of laws ... lease[s] may be terminated for cause only and only after the
tenant has been afforded an opportunity to be heard at a hearing, judicial or adminis-
trative." Complaint at 9-10, Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 67 Civ.
4307,(S.D.N.Y., Filed 1967). See supra, part II.A for a discussion of the construction
of the consent decree.
181. 553 N.Y.S.2d. 973 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1990).
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The court held that NYCHA residents hold no constitutional right
to an administrative hearing if due process can be afforded under
another proceeding.182 The court reasoned that "Bawdy House"
proceedings afford the minimal procedural safeguard provided for
under Escalera.8 3
Application of the "Bawdy House" laws affords significant due
process rights, both under constitutional law and within the scheme
of the Escalera decree. In fact, "Bawdy House" proceedings offer
tenants more procedural safeguards than the Escalera administra-
tive hearing process.18 4 The proceedings are held in court in front
of a judge. The judge hears the case in an evidentiary setting at
which both parties present written and oral testimony.18 5 The ten-
ant will be able to confront and cross-examine his "accuser.' '1 86
The proceedings even provide respondents the opportunity for a
jury trial.'8 7
Under "Bawdy House" provisions, the court reviews the case to
determine if the tenant should be evicted, as opposed to the Es-
calera process, under which the court reviews the case only to as-
sess if NYCHA followed the proper administrative proceedings.
As such, in "Bawdy House" cases tenants may have the case de-
cided by the housing court judge, or opt to have the case presented
before a jury. This option is not available under the Escalera de-
cree, which only provides for the tenant to have his case heard by
an impartial hearing officer who is employed by NYCHA. The fact
that "Bawdy House" proceedings are held in court as opposed to
182. Id. at 975. See also New York County District Attorney's Office v. McDaniels,
N.Y. L.J., May 24, 1991, at 22 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County); Bronx County District Attor-
ney's Office v. Mulrain, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 13, 1992, at 30 (Civ. Ct., Bronx County) (ad-
ministrative hearing unecessary in housing forfeiture).
183. Oquendo, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 976. The court found that the Escalera decree does
not require an administrative hearing in "Bawdy House" cases.
There is no requirement that the Housing Authority must be the forum in
which the tenant is afforded procedural protections prior to being evicted.
All procedural guarantees such as proper notice, access to information upon
which any decision is based, the right to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and the opportunity to represent evidence can and will be afforded to
[residents] in the hearing before [the] court [under the "Bawdy House"
Law].
Id.
184. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
185. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs § 745(1).
186. Id.
187. Id.
1996] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSENT DECREES 409
an administrative forum is not relevant to the tenant being af-
forded due process rights.188
The plaintiff class expresses concern that NYCHA will abuse the
modification and by-pass cases in which the facts are not consistent
with "Bawdy House" proceedings. Certain elements of proof must
be present, however, in order for tenants to face summary eviction
proceedings under the "Bawdy House" laws. The application of
"Bawdy House" proceedings are governed by high standards for
determining that the party used the residence to facilitate the drug
trade. In previous cases brought by the District Attorney's offices,
police actually arrested tenants either in or directly adjacent to the
apartment, and recovered a substantial amount of contraband indi-
cating drug trade. 189 The law has clearly established circumstances
under which the "Bawdy House" rules apply. The terms of the
modified decree will, therefore, be governed by the law with little
opportunity for abuse of the "Bawdy House" process.
2. The Proposed Modification is Tailored to Resolve the
Problems Created by the Changed Circumstances
Second, the proposed modification is tailored directly to the
problems that have been created due to the increase of drugs in
public housing. The court will consider that NYCHA has at-
tempted other means to alleviate the negative impact of drugs in
public housing developments.190 Despite the efforts, the presence
of drugs in the developments continues to be prevalent and to pose
a significant danger to the community.' 9'
188. Oquendo, 553 N.Y.S. 2d at 976.
189. Id. at 977. Residents were arrested inside their NYCHA apartment. Police
seized 73 tinfoil packets of cocaine, plastic bags containing heroin and cocaine, 212
heroin filled glassine envelopes, a .32 caliber semiautomatic pistol, live ammunition,
alleged drug records, and almost $4,500 in cash.
190. Compare Halderman v. Pennhurst, 784 F. Supp 215 (E.D.Penn. 1992), aff'd,
977 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992). The court denied the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's
motion to modify a consent decree under Rufo that required the state to relocate
residents in the Pennhurst state facility for retarded persons to community living ar-
rangements. The court found that the state had not fully complied with the decree,
and stated that "this motion is yet another attempt by the Commonwealth to avoid, or
at least delay, full compliance with the legal obligations the Commonwealth know-
ingly and willingly assumed. . ." Id. at 216. In Escalera, NYCHA has fully complied
with the terms of the agreement for almost 25 years, and in fact attempted numerous
alternative methods to alleviate the problems associated with the change conditions.
For a discussion of NYCHA's efforts, see infra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.
Modification of the decree is the only alternative left for NYCHA to eliminate the
impact of drugs by speedy removal of drug-dealing tenants from NYCHA
developments.
191. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
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• NYCHA has not merely relied on a modification of Escalera to
attempt to resolve the problems associated with the increase of
drugs in public housing developments., It has taken numerous ini-
tiatives to combat the overwhelming increase of criminal activity in
public housing. For instance, in 1993, NYCHA introduced the
New York City Housing Authority Security Pact Program.192
Under the new Security Pact program, increased and brighter light-
ing, electro-magnetic (unbreakable) locks and more secure inter-
coms have been or will be installed by the end of 1996.193
Additionally, NYCHA has increased high-impact police services,
including more patrol officers, special anti-narcotic strike forces,
community relations officers and increased tenant patrols radio-
linked to the police. 94 Nevertheless, NYCHA has been severely
hampered in its efforts because it is unable to remove expeditiously
drug-dealing tenants from public housing.
Plaintiffs contend that NYCHA has a more narrowly tailored
means to deal with these problem presented by the increase of
drugs in NYCHA developments, and therefore deference should
not be granted. 195 Plaintiffs believe that NYCHA can shorten,
streamline, or internally expedite drug eviction cases through the
existing administrative process. 196
Under Rufo, however, NYCHA is not obligated to find the least
intrusive means to address the problems; it must show only that the
proposed modification does not violate constitutional law and it
does not substantially change the decree for the modification to be
deemed "suitably tailored.' 97 In this case, NYCHA has demon-
strated that "Bawdy House" proceedings afford even more due
process rights than the Escalera procedures offer.'98 Additionally,
modification will not substantially change the decree; the purpose
192. See NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, SECURITY PACT PROGRAM
BROCHURE (1993)[hereinafter SECURITY PACT BROCHURE]. See also supra note 164
and accompanying text, for an explanation of the New York City Housing Authority
Public Housing Drug Elimination Program.
193. See SECURITY PACT BROCHURE.
194. Id.
195. Plaintiff's Brief at 18, Escalera (67 Civ. 4307) (arguing "that the administrative
process is relatively efficient and can be made more so-it is unnecessary to abolish
administrative hearings entirely in order to cure delays in the administrative
process.").
196. Id.
197. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 392.
198. See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
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of the decree is to ensure tenants due process in lease termination
procedures, and this will be achieved under the modification.199
Also, the Decree has a provision that allows for amendment or
modification so long as due process rights are protected.2 0 0 Be-
cause those rights are protected under "Bawdy House" laws,
NYCHA is under no obligation to tailor the administrative process
any further before seeking a modification.
3. The Court Must Defer to the Local Government Agency in
Determining Whether to Modify an Institutional Reform
Decree
NYCHA presents a compelling case for modification, including a
substantial change in circumstances since the consent decree agree-
ment was reached. Rufo permits district courts to consider the
judgment of local government officials in deciding on the propriety
of a modification. This is particulalry important in institutional re-
form cases, where old consent decrees impede the ability of the
government defendant to provide quality service to the public.20 '
NYCHA has complied with the terms of the decree for twenty-
four years. The changed conditions now demonstrate that the Es-
calera administrative process is no longer effective in evicting ten-
ants who use their apartments for drug trade. The court should,
therefore, defer to NYCHA's judgment that the modification is the
most expeditious way to remove drug-dealing tenants from public
housing.
Conclusion
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail permits flexibility in modi-
fying consent decrees resulting from institutional reform litigation.
Rufo's flexibility has the specific purpose of allowing government
defendants the ability to alter or change untimely, onerous and dif-
ficult decrees that impede on their ability to effectively serve the
public.
The presence of drugs in New York City Housing Authority de-
velopments has had a severe and detrimental effect on the quality
199. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
201. See Rufo, 502 U.S. 201 at 392. ("To refuse modification of a decree is to bind
all future officers of the State, regardless of their view of the necessity of relief from
one or more provisions of a decree.... ."). The Court stated that government officials
should be given deference because they are responsible for solving the problems of
institutional reform, of implementing a decree modification, and of the modification's
effect on the public that they serve.
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of life for all residents. NYCHA has taken drastic steps to address
these problems, but they are not enough. Only expeditious re-
moval of persons conducting drug-trade operations in NYCHA
apartments provides immediate relief from criminal activity faced
by NYCHA management and other public housing residents. Use
of the "Bawdy House" proceedings under a modified Escalera
Consent Decree is essential to addressing the drug boom in New
York City public housing.
As New York City government begins to challenge other long-
standing consent decrees,2 °2 the outcome of this case will set an
important precedent governing the City's ability to modify decrees
which impede on its ability to provide quality services to the public.
202. See Pines, supra note 125, at 1 ("The first legal battles are taking shape in the
Giuliani Administration's war on decades-old consent decrees that commit the city to
expensive services for such groups as prisoners, the homeless and disabled.").
